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Selected Developments in California Law
California v. Ciraolo: Has Backyard
Privacy Gone to Pot?
The fourth amendment of the United States Constitution protects
the person and property of an individual from unnecessary govern-
mental intrusions.' In California v. Ciraolo,2 the United States Su-
preme Court considered the application of the fourth amendment to
an aerial search of the curtilage of a home.3 The Court examined
whether warrantless aerial surveillance of the curtilage constitutes an
unreasonable search. 4
In Ciraolo, as a result of aerial surveillance, marijuana plants were
discovered growing on Ciraolo's property. The plants were seized
by the police, and Ciraolo was arrested and charged with the culti-
vation of marijuana.6 At trial, the defendant, Ciraolo, moved to
suppress the evidence on the theory that the aerial search was
unreasonable under the fourth amendment.7 When the motion was
denied, the defendant pleaded guilty to the charge.8
1. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, paper, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
2. 106 S. Ct. 1809 (1986).
3. Id. Curtilage is defined as "a small court, yard, garth, or piece of ground attached
to a dwelling-house, and forming one enclosure with it, or so regarded by the law; the area
attached to and containing a dwelling-house and its out-buildings." Id. at 1817 n.6 (Powell,
J., dissenting) (quoting 2 OxroRD ENGLISE DICTIONARY 1278 (1933)). Generally the curtilage
is construed to include at least the yard around the dwelling house and the areas that are
occupied by out-buildings. Care v. United States, 231 F.2d 22, 25 (10th Cir. 1956).
4. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1811-13. See infra text accompanying notes 83-91 (discussion
of curtilage and the fourth amendment).
5. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1811.
6. Id. Ciraolo was charged under CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11358.(West 1975).
People v. Ciraolo, 161 Cal. App. 3d 1081, 1084, 208 Cal. Rptr. 93, 94 (1984).
7. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1811.
8. Id.
1003
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 18
The California Court of Appeal reversed, 9 concluding that the
warrantless aerial observation of the defendant's backyard violated
the fourth amendment because the area observed was within the
curtilage of the defendant's home.'0 The court concluded that Ciraolo
had demonstrated a reasonable expectation of privacy by maintaining
two fences surrounding his backyard." After the state's petition for
review was denied by the California Supreme Court, the United
States Supreme Court granted a petition for certiorari. 12 In reversing
the decision of the California Court of Appeal, the United States
Supreme Court stated that although the defendant may have mani-
fested a reasonable expectation of privacy from some observation,
the expectation that there would be privacy from all observation was
unreasonable. 3 The Court reasoned that the legitimacy of an expec-
tation of privacy depends not on whether the activity has been
concealed, but on whether the governmental intrusion infringes on
the values protected by the fourth amendment. 14
Part I of this Note summarizes the facts of Ciraolo and reviews
the opinion of the Supreme Court. 5 Part I also discusses the com-
panion case to Ciraolo, Dow Chemical v. United States, which
considered the fourth amendment implications of aerial surveillance
of an industrial plant. 6 Part II examines the legal background of
the Ciraolo decision concentrating on previous Supreme Court deci-
sions regarding search and seizure, and California decisions regarding
aerial surveillance. 7 Finally, the effects and ramifications of the case
are discussed in part III.8
I. THE CASE
A. The Facts
On September 2, 1982, the Santa Clara police department received
an anonymous tip that marijuana was growing in the defendant's
9. People v. Ciraolo, 161 Cal. App. 3d 1081, 208 Cal. Rptr. 93 (1984).
10. Id. at 1087-90, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 96-98.
11. Id. at 1089, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 97. In so holding, the court relied on Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1969). See infra notes 101-08 and accompanying text (discussion of
Katz).
12. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1811.
13. Id. at 1812.
14. Id.
15. See infra notes 19-78 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 57-78 and accompanying text.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 89-109.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 187-230.
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backyard. 19 The police attempted to view the property from the
ground, but were unsuccessful because two fences completely sur-
rounded the defendant's yard.20 Later that day, two police officers
engaged a private plane and flew directly over the defendant's home
at an altitude of approximately 1000 feet, within navigable airspace.
21
During the overflight, the officers, who were trained in marijuana
identification, observed and photographed marijuana plants growing
in the yard. 22 Six days later, a search warrant was issued, based on
an affidavit describing the anonymous tip and the aerial observa-
tions. 2a Having obtained the search warrant, the police seized seventy-
three marijuana plants from the defendant's backyard. 24 At trial,
Ciraolo contested the use of the evidence discovered through the
aerial surveillance arguing that the surveillance was an illegal search
under the fourth amendment. 25
B. The Majority Opinion
After the California Court of Appeal reversed Ciraolo's conviction,
the state petitioned the California Supreme Court to review the case.
When the petition was denied, the state then petitioned the United
States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which was granted.
26
In a five to four opinion, Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority,
analyzed the case according to the two-pronged inquiry first articu-
lated by Justice Harlan in his concurrence in Katz v. United States.27
The first question asked under the Katz analysis is whether the
19. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1810.
20. Id. The outer fence was six feet in height and the inner fence was ten feet in height.
Id.
21. Id. The ownership of airspace above the ground only extends to airspace that can be
occupied and used in connection with the enjoyment and use of the land. United States v.
Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 264 (1945). The airspace above this level belongs to the public. Hinman
v. Pacific Air Transp., 84 F.2d 755, 758 (1936), cert. denied, 300 U.S. 654 (1936). "There is
recognized and declared to exist in behalf of any citizen of the United States a public right
of freedom of transit through the navigable airspace of the United States." 49 U.S.C.A. §
1304 (West 1976).
22. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1810-11. The camera used to photograph the plants was not
used for visual assistance, but only for evidentiary purposes. The identification of the marijuana
plants was made by observation with the naked eye. Id. at 1809.
23. Id. at 1811. A photograph was attached to the affidavit as an exhibit. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1811-13; see Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring). The two-pronged Katz inquiry developed primarily from the concurrence written
by Justice Harlan. For a more detailed explanation of the Katz decision, see infra text
accompanying notes 100-11.
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individual has manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the
object of the challenged search. 28 The Court agreed that by erecting
fences, Ciraolo clearly had manifested an expectation of privacy, at
least as to ground level views. 29 Once the court finds that the
defendant manifested a subjective expectation of privacy, the second
inquiry is whether society will recognize that expectation as reason-
able. 30 This question proved to be a more controversial issue for the
court in Ciraolo .3
Justice Burger observed that the legitimacy of an expectation of
privacy is not based on whether the individual subject to the search
has concealed an activity but on whether the governmental intrusion
"infringes upon the personal and societal values protected by the
fourth amendment. ' 32 Applying this reasoning, the Court held that
the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy from aerial
surveillance, even though the area searched was within the defendant's
curtilage. 33 The Court stated that all police observation is not barred
simply because the area observed is within the curtilage of the home. 4
Even though an individual may have attempted to restrict public view
of a particular area, the police are not restricted from viewing the
area from a public vantage point.35 Relying on the Katz decision, the
Court stated that something which is knowingly exposed to the public
is not a subject of fourth amendment protection. 6 The Court em-
phasized that the police observations in this case were made nonin-
trusively, with the naked eye, and within public airspace.3 7
In concluding that aerial observation of the defendant's property
did not violate the fourth amendment, Justice Burger distinguished
28. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
29. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1811. The appellate court found that the defendant had
manifested an expectation of privacy. The state did not challenge this finding, and therefore
the United States Supreme Court did not address the issue. Id. at 1811-12.
30. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
31. See infra text accompanying notes 42-56 (the Katz tests as viewed by the Ciraolo
dissent).
32. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 181-83 (1984), quoted in Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct.
at 1812.
33. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1812.
34. Id. Stated otherwise, the Court held that the fourth amendment does not require
police or other government officials to cover their eyes when passing by a private home. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1812. Ciraolo asserted that he did everything that he could reasonably be
expected to do to manifest his desire for privacy. Ciraolo argued that being required to cover
his backyard would defeat the purpose of the yard as an outdoor living area. He did not
believe that by failing to cover his yard he knowingly exposed himself to aerial surveillance
by the police. Id. at 1813.
37. Id. at 1813.
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the electronic developments Justice Harlan warned of in his Katz
concurrence 8 from the increasingly common use of aircraft.3 9 Justice
Burger noted that in an era when private airplanes are used routinely,
an assumption that observation from an aircraft would be protected
by the fourth amendment would be unreasonable. 4° The Court held
that the defendant's expectation that his privacy was protected from
aerial observation in his backyard was not an expectation society
would honor, and therefore was unreasonable. 4
1
C. The Dissent
The four dissenting justices42 expressed concern over what they
perceived as the majority's departure from the Katz analysis. 43 In the
dissenting opinion, Justice Powell asserted that the majority had
ignored Justice Harlan's warning in Katz.44 Instead, Powell con-
tended, the majority returned to a fourth amendment analysis based
only on physical intrusions, failing to consider technological advance-
ments .45
The dissenters stated that the fourth amendment should not be an
unchanging rule, 46 but should be interpreted according to contem-
38. Katz, 389 U.S. at 360-62 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan warned that a
decision which suggested that the fourth amendment did not restrict electronic invasion unless
coupled with physical intrusions "is in the present day, bad physics as well as bad law, for
reasonable expectations of privacy may be defeated by electronic as well as physical invasion."
Id. at 363.
39. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1813.
40. Id.
41. Id. The appellate court decision made a sharp distinction between aerial surveillance
by the police focusing on a particular home, and those made on routine patrols. Because the
observations in this case were deliberate, not random, the California Court of Appeal held
that the defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy was violated. People v. Ciraolo, 161
Cal. App. 3d 1081, 1089, 208 Cal. Rptr. 93, 97 (1984), rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 1809 (1986). The
United States Supreme Court disagreed, finding instead that the purposes for which a plane
flies overhead would not affect the defendant's expectation of privacy. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at
1813 n.2.
42. The dissenting opinion was written by Justice Powell. Justices Blackmun, Brennan,
and Marshall joined the opinion. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1814 (Powell, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 1814-16 (Powell, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 1814. The majority asserted that Justice Harlan's warning was not ignored, but
that the warning was not applicable to the situation in Ciraolo. Justice Burger stated that
Justice Harlan's warning was not intended for "simple visual observations from public places."
The majority opinion expressed doubt that in 1967 Justice Harlan considered an aircraft to
be within a category of "future electronic developments" that could infringe on an individual's
privacy. Id. at 1813.
45. Id. at 1817.
46. Id. at 1815. See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 217 n.10 (1981) (both crime
and law enforcement have changed, and actions taken by law enforcement agents three centuries
ago should not govern what we now regard as proper); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573,
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porary conditions.47 The dissenting opinion suggests that a contem-
porary interpretation of the fourth amendment should include the
consideration of technological developments, including the utilization
of the airplane as a means of surveillance. 48 Justice Powell wrote
that when a search is defined only in terms of physical intrusion, no
fourth amendment protection exists against those types of surveillance
made available through advances in technology. 49 The dissenters
believed that although the majority purported to reaffirm Katz, their
summary rejection of the expectation of privacy argument indicated
a rejection of the principles underlying the Katz decision. 0
In addition to disapproving of the majority's Katz analysis, the
dissent found fault with the majority's interpretation of the curtilage
doctrine. Justice Powell asserted that while the majority implicitly
acknowledged that a reasonable expectation of privacy exists within
the curtilage from ground level observation, according to the majority
a privacy expectation does not exist when the same area is viewed
from the air. 52 Justice Powell stated that the reasonable expectation
of privacy within the curtilage should not be nullified by purposeful
police surveillance from the air.53
Finally, the dissent disagreed with the majority's failure to ade-
quately enforce the privacy rights in the home and surrounding
areas.Y According to the dissent, the majority did not consider the
traditional presumption that any warrantless intrusion into the home
is unreasonable.5 5 Justice Powell remarked that although an individual
does not have a right to engage in illegal conduct within the home,
591 n.33 (1980) (Supreme Court has not fixed into law the enforcement practices that existed
at the time the fourth amendment originated); United States v. United States District Court,
407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972) (interpreting Katz as a refusal to confine the fourth amendment to
situations which involve actual trespasses).
47. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1815 (Powell, J., dissenting); Steagald, 451 U.S. at 217 n.10.
48. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1817 (Powell, J., dissenting).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1816.
51. Id. at 1816-17.
52. Id. at 1817-18. Justice Powell asserted that the majority's holding was based only on
the fact that airspace is available to anyone who chooses to travel in an airplane. Justice
Powell stated that the majority did not explain why the availability of the airways for
transportation should remove privacy rights in enclosed curtilage. Id. at 1818.
53. Id. at 1818.
54. Id. at 1816.
55. Id. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714 (1984) (private residences are places
where privacy from warrantless governmental intrusion is expected); Payton v. New York, 445
U.S. 573, 589 (1980) (the zone of privacy in a home is clearly defined, and the threshold may
not be crossed without a warrant, unless exigent circumstances are present); Silverman v.
United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) (fourth amendment gives individuals the right to
retreat into the home and be free from governmental intrusion).
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police are required by the fourth amendment to obtain a warrant
before intruding into an individual's privacy.5 6
D. Dow Chemical Co. v. United States
Dow Chemical Co. v. United States5 7 a companion case to Ciraolo,
also involved aerial surveillance of private property. In Dow, the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) made an on-site inspection
of the Dow Chemical plant in Michigan, with Dow's consent 8.5
Subsequently, the EPA requested a second inspection. When Dow
refused to allow the inspection, the EPA hired a private aerial
photographer to survey and photograph the chemical plant.5 9 After
learning of this activity, Dow brought an action against the EPA,
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.60 In the district court action,
Dow alleged that the EPA's actions exceeded its statutory investi-
gative authority under the Clean Air Act and also constituted a
search violative of the fourth amendment.6 2 Dow asserted that the
outdoor areas which the EPA photographed were "industrial curti-
lage," and therefore should be given the same constitutional protec-
tion as the curtilage of a home. 63 Because the area assertedly had
constitutional protection, Dow contended that an expectation of
privacy from aerial surveillance was reasonable 4 The district court
agreed with Dow's contentions and issued an order permanently
enjoining the EPA from taking aerial photographs of Dow's property
56. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1819 n.l1 (Powell, J., dissenting).
57. 106 S. Ct. 1819 (1986).
58. Id. at 1822.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1822. Dow sought injunctive and declaratory relief against aerial surveillance
and photography of the Dow industrial complex by the EPA. Id.
61. Id. Section 114(a)(2) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7414(a)(2) (West 1983)
provides:
[T]he Administrator or his authorized representative, upon presentation of his
credentials-(A) shall have a right of entry to, upon, or through any premises of
such person or in which any records required to be maintained under paragraph (1)
of this section are located, and (B) may at reasonable times have access to and copy
any records, inspect any monitoring equipment or method required under paragraph
(1), and sample any emissions which such person is required to sample under
paragraph (1).
Id.
62. Dow, 106 S. Ct. at 1822. Dow also claimed that trade secret laws, which protect the
company from aerial photography by competitors should apply in the fourth amendment
analysis. The Supreme Court disagreed, stating that laws governing unfair competition are
irrelevant to fourth amendment inquiries. Id. at 1823.
63. Id. at 1823.
64. Id.
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and from releasing, distributing, or copying the photographs which
had already been taken.6 5 On the EPA's appeal, however, the ap-
pellate court reversed, 6 holding that although Dow had a reasonable
expectation of privacy from ground level observation, the expectation
of privacy from aerial surveillance was not reasonable. 67 When the
case was appealed to the United States Supreme Court, the Court
rejected both Dow's assertion that the EPA had exceeded its statutory
authority under the Clean Air Act and the contention that the
surveillance constituted an unreasonable search.68 Regarding the in-
vestigative authority under the Clean Air Act, the Court held that
although that Act does not specifically authorize aerial inspections,
neither does it expressly forbid this type of investigation. 69 As a
result, the EPA was held to be within the authority granted by the
Clean Air Act.70
The Supreme Court also disagreed with Dow's arguments that
taking photographs of an industrial plant was a search prohibited by
the fourth amendment.7' Responding to Dow's assertion that the
plant deserved the protection traditionally given to curtilage, the
Court concluded that an open-air plant72 was not analogous to the
curtilage of a home. 73 For the purposes of aerial surveillance, the
Court held that an industrial complex more closely resembled an
open field, 74 a location where there can be no legitimate expectation
of privacy.7 5
65. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 536 F. Supp. 1355, 1366-69 (E.D. Mich. 1982),
rev'd, 749 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 106 S. Ct. 1819 (1986). The trial court held that
the privacy expectation was reasonable, partially due to the trade secret restrictions placed on
Dow's competitors.
66. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 749 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1984), aff'd 106 S. Ct. 1819
(1986).
67. Id. at 313.
68. Dow, 106 S. Ct. at 1824, 1827.
69. Id. at 1823. The Court in Dow stated that the Clean Air Act expands, rather than
restricts, the EPA's investigatory authority. The powers listed in the statute are not exclusive.
Id.
70. Id. at 1824.
71. Id. at 1827. In their discussion of whether taking aerial photographs was a search
violative of the fourth amendment, the Court only considered a situation such as that in Dow,
where the type of property is analogous to an open field. The Court did not discuss aerial
photography of curtilage. Presumably, the propriety of aerial photography of curtilage is still
in question. Id.
72. The Dow Chemical plant in Michigan is a 2000 acre facility for chemical manufac-
turing. The plant consists of numerous covered buildings. Located between the buildings are
manufacturing equipment and piping conduits which can be viewed from the air. Id. at 1822.
73. Id. at 1827.
74. Id. See infra text accompanying notes 85-91 (discussion of "open fields" concept).
75. Dow, 106 S. Ct. at 1826. It should be noted that Dow did attempt to protect privacy
1010
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As in Ciraolo, the Court in Dow purported to reaffirm the curtilage
doctrine. 76 At the same time, however, the Court refused to allow
fourth amendment protection of private outdoor property from aerial
surveillance.77 In Dow, this denial of fourth amendment protection
is justifiable on the grounds that the chemical plant is not analogous
to curtilage.7 8 The same result is more difficult to understand in
Ciraolo, where the protection afforded the curtilage is contradictory
to the conclusion that no fourth amendment protection exists from
aerial surveillance.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The right of an individual to be secure from governmental intrusion
is a fundamental constitutional right.79 Originally, the courts inter-
preted this right in terms of property law, requiring a physical
intrusion in order to find a search.80 Over time, fourth amendment
law evolved into an analysis of whether the government violated an
individual's expectation of privacy.8 Ciraolo indicates that the court
is returning to a property-based analysis.8 2
A. Supreme Court Decisions
Early interpretations of the fourth amendment were based on
property and trespass law.83 A search under fourth amendment prin-
within the plant. The Dow Chemical plant had a specific policy regarding aerial surveillance.
As part of the security program, plant employees were to obtain identification numbers of all
planes making several passes over the area. Employees were then to locate the pilot to
determine if photographs had been taken of the plant. If so, the photographer was requested
to turn the film over to Dow for review. Id. at 1828 n.3 (Powell, J., dissenting). According
to the Court, these organized efforts were not enough to manifest an expectation of privacy
from aerial surveillance. Id. at 1826 (majority opinion).
76. Id. at 1825.
77. Id. at 1825-27.
78. Id. at 1827.
79. See Comment, Aerial Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment, 17 J. MARSHALL L.
REv. 455, 457 (1984) (citing Nuestein v. District of Columbia, 115 F.2d 690, 692-93 (D.C.
Cir. 1940); United States v. Three Tons Coal, 28 F. Cas. 149, 151 (D. Wis. 1875) (No. 16,515)
(constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures has its source in common
law and English history); United States v. Crosby, 25 F. Cas. 701, 704 (S.C. Cir. 1871) (No.
14,893) (right to be secure against unreasonable search existed before the adoption of the
constitution)).
80. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
81. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (1967); Comment,
Warrantless Aerial Surveillance: A Constitutional Analysis, 35 V"D. L. Rav. 409, 412 (1982).
82. See supra text accompanying notes 1-14 & 19-26.
83. See Comment, supra note 79, at 457-63 (detailed discussion of historical property
values).
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ciples required a physical intrusion into a "constitutionally protected
area."18 4 Under this property-based analysis, land was placed into one
of three categories to determine the amount of constitutional protec-
tion allowed. 85 The three categories consisted of the dwelling, 6 the
curtilage,8 7 and the outlying property or open fields." According to
traditional analysis, the the dwelling areas received the greatest pro-
tection.8 9 The curtilage areas also received substantial protection
because the curtilage was viewed as an extension of the home.90
Under common law doctrines, open fields were given minimal pro-
tection.91
Early technological developments, and the intrusions which accom-
panied them, did not change property-based fourth amendment anal-
ysis. In Olmstead v. United States,92 the United States Supreme Court
held that wiretapping did not constitute an unlawful search or sei-
zure.93 Listening without any physical intrusion was not a trespass
84. See Comment, Open Air Searches and Enhanced Surveillance in California, 21 SANTA
CLAM L. REv. 779, 780 (1981) (citing Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 59 (1967) (purpose
of probable cause requirement of the fourth amendment is to keep the state out of constitu-
tionally protected areas until there is reason to believe a crime is being committed); and Lopez
v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 438-39 (1963) (only fourth amendment requirement regarding
eavesdropping is that the electronic device not planted by unlawful physical violation into
constitutionally protected areas)).
85. See Comment, supra note 79, at 462-63.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 463. Curtilage has traditionally meant the outer buildings and land immediately
surrounding the home. See supra note 3 (definition of curtilage).
88. See Comment, supra note 79, at 463.
89. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976) (sanctity of private
dwellings is ordinarily afforded the most stringent fourth amendment protection); United States
v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972) (physical entry into the home is the
chief evil against which the fourth amendment is directed); Silverman v. United States, 365
U.S. 505, 511 (1961) (individuals have the right to be free from unreasonable governmental
intrusion in the home).
90. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (fourth amendment is violated
if there is a physical invasion of the home or curtilage); United States v. Molkenbur, 430 F.2d
563, 566 (8th Cir. 1970) (police seizure of merchandise in the curtilage was unreasonable
because the curtilage is entitled to the same protection as the home, unless objects are in plain
view). See also Comment, Curtilage or Open Fields?: Oliver v. United States Gives Renewed
Significance to the Concept of Curtilage in Fourth Amendment Analysis, 46 U. Pirr. L. REv.
795, 796 n.11 (1985).
91. Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924). In Hester, the Supreme Court concluded
that "[tihe special protection afforded by the Fourth Amendment to the people in their
'persons, houses, papers, and effects' is not extended to the open fields. The distinction
between [open fields] and the house is as old as the common law." Id. at 59. See also United
States v. Capps, 435 F.2d 637, 640 (9th Cir. 1970) (information gained from a trespass on
open field not constitutionally tainted); Soli v. Superior Court, 103 Cal. App. 3d 72, 79, 162
Cal. Rptr. 840, 844 (1980) (in determining the degree of fourth amendment protection, open
fields are near the bottom of a descending scale).
92. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
93. Id. at 466.
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according to the Court in Olmstead. Therefore, wiretapping did not
constitute a fourth amendment violation under the property-based
analysis. 94 In subsequent cases, the requirement of a physical intrusion
was interpreted very strictly; the slightest physical penetration could
trigger a fourth amendment violation. 95 For example, in Silverman
v. United States,96 a spike mike97 was placed into a party wall, where
the microphone made contact with the defendants' heating duct.98
The Supreme Court held that this physical penetration was violative
of the fourth amendment.
99
Though fourth amendment analysis did not change because of
early technological advancements, the increased use of electronic
surveillance necessitated a more flexible approach to determining
claims based on the fourth amendment. 1' Q In Katz v. United States, 10
the Supreme Court recognized for the first time that the traditional
property analysis was inadequate for evaluating searches under the
fourth amendment. 0 2 The majority opinion in Katz stressed that the
fourth amendment "protects people, not places."'' 3 Following Katz,
search and seizure analysis no longer focused exclusively on the area
subject to search, but included consideration of the privacy expec-
tations of the person observed.' ° According to the Katz rationale,
94. Id. at 464-65. Cases which followed the Olmstead decision also required physical
intrusion in order to find a fourth amendment violation. See, e.g., Goldman v. United States,
316 U.S. 129, 134 (1942), wherein a listening device which recorded conversations was placed
on a party wall. No fourth amendment violation was found because no physical intrusion
occurred. Id. See also Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 439 (1963). In Lopez, an
undercover agent with a hidden microphone recorded conversations between himself and the
defendant in the defendant's office. No fourth amendment violation was found because the
agent entered the defendant's office with consent. Id.
95. Clinton v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 158, 158 (1964) (per curiam) (spiked microphone sufficient
penetration of premises to be considered a fourth amendment violation); Silverman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 505, 511-12 (1961).
96. 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
97. A spike mike is an electronic listening device. The device consists of a foot long spike
attached to a microphone, with an amplifier, power pack, and earphones. By placing the spike
mike in a heating duct, as was done in Silverman, the heating system became a sound
conductor. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 511-12.
100. See Comment, supra note 81, at 412.
101. 389 U.S. 347 (1969). In Katz, a wiretapping device planted on the outside of a public
telephone booth recorded incriminating telephone calls made by the defendant. Id. at 348.
102. See Comment, supra note 81, at 412.
103. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
104. Id. at 350-53. All property considerations did not disappear after Katz. For example,
there may be a higher expectation of privacy inside a home than outside in a yard. See, e.g.,
United States v. Allen, 633 F.2d 1282, 1289 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 833 (1981)
(privacy expectation is associated with the interior of residences); People v. Sneed, 32 Cal.
1013
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what a person knowingly exposes to the public is not a subject of
fourth amendment protection. 05
In his concurring opinion in Katz, Justice Harlan clarified the
majority's analysis. 106 Justice Harlan stated that the correct inquiries
in analyzing a search under the fourth amendment were, "first that
a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy
and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to
recognize as 'reasonable.""1o7 Justice Harlan's language was thereafter
adopted as the standard analysis for addressing all fourth amendment
inquiries,0 replacing the "constitutionally protected areas" test of
Olmstead and its successors.
Despite the development of the two-pronged inquiry in Katz v.
United States, some remnants of the traditional property analysis
persisted.109 Courts continued to distinguish between curtilage and
open fields. Activities within the curtilage were still protected,10 while
those conducted in open fields were not."'
App. 3d 535, 541, 108 Cal. Rptr. 146, 150 (1973) (to determine reasonable expectation ofprivacy, factors such as location, type of structure, and fencing must be considered). See also
infra text accompanying notes 150-53 (detailed discussion of Sneed).105. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. The knowing exposure rule applies even if the area exposed is
of a private nature, such as a home or office. Id.
106. Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
107. Id. at 361.
108. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (using Harlan's concurrence as the crux
of the holding in Katz). Harlan's reasonable expectation of privacy test has been criticized asbeing too easily manipulated. For example, if the government announced that a new surveillance
technique would now be routinely used to observe the interior of private homes, a subjective
expectation of privacy in the home would no longer be reasonable. See Amsterdam, Perspectives
on the Fourth Amendment, 58 Mnr. L. Rav. 349, 384 (1974). See also Smith v. Maryland,442 U.S. 735, 740-42 n.5 (1975) (Justice Harlan's test inadequate in certain situations). Another
critcism is that the requirement of a physical manifestation of privacy is problematic in any
aerial search situation because of the near impossibility of manifesting privacy skyward. See
Comment, supra note 79, at 470 n.68.
109. In the year following the Katz decision, the ninth circuit decided Wattenberg v. UnitedStates, 388 F.2d 853 (9th Cir. 1968). In Wattenburg, the court held that contraband which
was 20 to 35 feet from the defendant's home was entitled to fourth amendment protectionbecause the contraband was within the curtilage. Id. at 857. The court went on to say,however, that a better inquiry after Katz was whether there was an intrusion into an area the
defendant attempted to maintain as private. Id. at 857.110. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984) (privacy may be legitimately expectedin areas immediately surrounding the home); Wilson v. Health & Hosp. Corp., 620 F.2d 1201,1209 (7th Cir. 1980) (open fields and plain view exceptions to warrant requirements do notjustify warrantless search of, or entry into curtilage); United States v. Stroble, 431 F.2d 1273,1276 (6th Cir. 1973) (item within curtilage of home protected by fourth amendment); Watten-
burg, 388 F.2d at 857. See infra notes 112-19 (detailed discussion of Oliver).
111. Air Pollution Variance Bd. v. Western Alfalfa Corp., 415 U.S. 861, 865 (1974) (thepublic is not excluded from areas such as open fields); Oliver, 466 U.S. at 178 (open fields
not within protection of fourth amendment). Under the plain view doctrine, an activity oritem loses fourth amendment protection if it can be observed by someone who is in a location
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Seventeen years after the Katz decision, the United States Supreme
Court narrowed the two-pronged Katz test in Oliver v. United States. "
2
In Oliver, the Court also reinforced earlier property law interpreta-
tions of the fourth amendment. 1 3 The Court gave renewed consti-
tutional significance to the curtilage doctrine, holding that privacy
may not legitimately be expected in the outdoors, except in those
areas immediately surrounding the home.14 In contrast to the Katz
decision, the Oliver Court emphasized the area or type of property
involved, rather than the expectation of privacy manifested by the
person subjected to the search. 115 The Court further stated that the
steps taken by an individual to ensure privacy are irrelevant in
determining whether a search was reasonable.116 The test for a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy is not that the individual chose to
hide the activity, but whether the governmental intrusion "infringes
upon the personal and societal values protected by the Fourth Amend-
ment." " 7 Although Katz was not specifically overruled, the Court in
effect rejected the first prong of the Katz test.118 After the Oliver
decision, courts were only required to consider the second part of
the Katz test. 19
Thus, prior to the Katz decision, the Supreme Court followed
historical property doctrines in the analysis of search and seizure
cases under the fourth amendment. Katz, however, signaled a change
where the person has a right to be. See, e.g., Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 737-38 (1983)
(police officer must lawfully be in position from which contraband can be viewed); Coolidge
v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465-66 (1971) (object in plain view if police officer had
prior justification for an intrusion and while in the private area inadvertantly sees incriminating
evidence).
112. 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
113. Id. at 178-80.
114. Id. at 180.
115. Id. at 178-82. The Court reaffirmed Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924). See
supra note 91 (discussion of Hester).
116. "[W]e reject the suggestion that steps taken to protect privacy establish that expec-
tations of privacy in an open field are legitimate." Oliver, 466 U.S. at 182. See Comment,
supra note 90 at 808 n.87 (Oliver holding implies that steps taken by an individual to insure
privacy in a particular locale are irrelevant).
117. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 178-82. The Court, however, did not articulate exactly what these
protected values are.
118. See Comment, supra note 90, at 808-09 n.87. The first prong of the Katz test asks
whether the individual has manifested a reasonable subjective expectation of privacy. Katz,
389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). Oliver seems to reject the first prong because the
inquiry is irrelevant to the personal and societal values protected by the fourth amendment.
Oliver, 466 U.S. at 182.
119. See Comment, supra note 90, at 808 n.87. The second prong of Katz asks whether
society will accept the individual's privacy interest as reasonable and legitimate. Katz, 389 U.S.
at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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in the Court's approach. Following Katz, the Court began to look
not at the particular property searched, but at the subjective intent
of individuals, as manifested by the actions taken to protect their
privacy. 120 In Oliver, however, emphasis on the intent of individuals
began to erode, in favor of greater concern in law enforcement for
the interests of society as a whole.' 2 1
B. California Decisions
In 1969 the California Supreme Court adopted an approach similar
to Katz for analyzing search and seizure cases. People v. Edwards12
marked the first time the California Supreme Court refrained from
using the traditional definitions of curtilage and open fields in a
fourth amendment case. 23 The court stated that the more appropriate
question in determining whether a search violates the fourth amend-
ment is whether the individual has manifested a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy. 24 If so, the next inquiry is whether that privacy has
been intruded upon by government officials.'21
After the Edwards decision, the reasonable expectation of privacy
test became the standard analysis in fourth amendment cases. 26 In
Lorenzana v. Superior Court, 27 police officers acting on an inform-
ant's tip trespassed onto the defendant's property and peered into
his window through a gap in the drawn window shade. i2s The officers
120. See supra text accompanying notes 79-118.
121. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 182.
122. 71 Cal. 2d 1096, 458 P.2d 713, 80 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1969).
123. Id. at 1100, 1103-04, 458 P.2d at 715, 717-18, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 635, 637 (formal
rejection of property based distinctions and adoption of Katz analysis). See Comment, supra
note 84, at 788.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1100, 458 P.2d at 715, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 635.
126. See, e.g., People v. Triggs, 8 Cal. 3d 884, 506 P.2d 232, 106 Cal. Rptr. 408 (1973).
Triggs involved police surveillance of illegal sex acts in a public restroom. Id. at 888, 506 P.2d
at 234-35, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 410-11. Although the individual stalls had no doors, and the acts
were conducted in plain view, the defendants still had a reasonable expectation of privacy
because they had no reason to suspect that clandestine surveillance was taking place. Id. at891-92, 506 P.2d at 236-37, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 412-13. An exception to the use of the reasonable
expectation of privacy test was People v. Dumas, 9 Cal. 3d 871, 512 P.2d 1208, 109 Cal.
Rptr. 304 (1973). In Dumas, the California Supreme Court employed a "hierarchy of protec-
tion" analysis. This hierarchy applied protection in varying degrees, depending upon the nature
of the area searched. In this sliding scale analysis, houses were given a high degree of
protection, while public areas were not. The court suggested that one standard of reasonableness
be used for all locations, but the standard should include the realization that not all locations
are deserving of equal protection. Id. at 881-82, 512 P.2d at 1215-16, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 311-
12.
127. 9 Cal. 3d 626, 511 P.2d 33, 108 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1973).
128. Id. at 630, 511 P.2d at 36, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 588.
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observed defendant Lorenzana apparently handling narcotics and
proceeded to forcibly enter the house and arrest the defendant.
29
The court held that a governmental intrusion into an area in which
an individual has manifested a reasonable expectation of privacy is
an unreasonable search under the fourth amendment. 30 In addition,
the court reasoned that the type of intrusion was irrelevant in
determining whether a reasonable expectation of privacy existed.'
31
Thus, governmental intrusion into an individual's reasonable expec-
tation of privacy was considered an unreasonable search, whether
accomplished by physical, auditory, or visual means.1
32
Until 1985, when the California Supreme Court decided People v.
Cook,133 aerial search cases had been decided only at the intermediate
appellate level in California. 34 The appellate courts had consistently
analyzed aerial surveillance cases differently than those cases involv-
ing ground level surveillance. Generally, the California courts did
not hold that aerial surveillance of backyards or other fenced areas
was unconstitutional. 135 The aerial search cases in California tended
to contradict the Katz approach 36 by focusing on the lack of physical
intrusion and on the nature of the activity discovered, rather than
on the privacy expectation of the person subjected to the search.
137
The first California case involving aerial surveillance was People
v. Sneed.3 J In Sneed, a helicopter flew at a very low altitude over
129. Id. at 631, 511 P.2d at 36-7, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 588-89.
130. Id. at 639, 511 P.2d at 42, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 594.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. 41 Cal. 3d 373, 710 P.2d 299, 221 Cal. Rptr. 499 (1985). See infra text accompanying
notes 158-72.
134. See infra text accompanying notes 135-56 (discussion of appellate level aerial search
cases).
135. See People v. Joubert, 118 Cal. App. 3d 637, 647, 173 Cal. Rptr. 428, 434 (1981)
(no right to privacy from aerial search); People v. Superior Court (Stroud), 37 Cal. App. 3d
836, 839, 112 Cal. Rptr. 764, 765 (1974) (no reasonable expectation of privacy in backyard
used for storage of stolen auto body parts); Dean v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. App. 3d 112,
118-19, 110 Cal. Rptr. 585, 589-90 (1973) (no reasonable expectation of privacy unless activity
within "mankind's common habits"). See also Burkholder v. Superior Court, 96 Cal. App.
3d 421, 158 Cal. Rptr. 86 (1979). According to the Burkholder court, the possessor of land
used for cultivation of illegal crops can have no reasonable expectation of privacy from
overflight. Id. at 425, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 88. In Burkholder, however, a fourth amendment
violation was found because of an illegal ground search rather than because of the overflight.
Id. at 429, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 91.
136. See Comment, supra note 84, at 790-94.
137. Burkholder, 96 Cal. App. 3d at 425, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 88 (possessor of land devoted
to cultivation of contraband can exhibit no reasonable expectation of privacy consistent with
common habits of those engaged in agriculture); Stroud, 37 Cal. App. 3d at 839, 112 Cal.
Rptr. at 765 (no reasonable expectation of privacy for storage of stolen automobile parts in
backyard).
138. 32 Cal. App. 3d 535, 108 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1973).
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the defendant's yard in search of marijuana. 3 9 The surveillance was
held to constitute an unreasonable search, due to the unusually low
elevation of the helicopter.140 The court stated that if the helicopter
had flown at a reasonable altitude, no intrusion would have oc-
curred.' 4'
Although the Sneed analysis was based on traditional property
concepts, other courts recognized the need to consider technological
advancements when evaluating fourth amendment claims. 42 In Dean
v. Superior Court,143 an aerial search was conducted after police
received a tip that marijuana was growing on the defendant's prop-
erty. During the flight, marijuana plants were discovered growing on
a tract of land surrounded by a forest. 44 While acknowledging that
a reasonable expectation of privacy may extend into airspace, 45 the
appellate court found no fourth amendment violation.' 46 Because the
defendant had not exhibited an expectation of privacy consistent with
what the court referred to as the "common habits" of persons
engaged in agriculture, he had not manifested a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy from overflights. 47 According to the Dean court, the
common habits of society in the use of property supplies the measure
of reasonableness for a privacy expectation. 48 The defendant's sub-jective expectations are immaterial if the use of the property is not
consistent with what society deems normal for that property. "41
The concept that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy
when property is viewed from the air was expanded in People v.
139. The police were responding to a telephone tip. Id. at 540, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 149.140. The helicopter was flying at an altitude of 20 to 25 feet. Id. at 542-43, 108 Cal. Rptr.
at 151.
141. The court noted that this height was probably so low as to be considered illegal. Id.
at 542 n.1, 108 Cal Rptr. at 151 n.1. The court also suggested that the flight, if reasonable,
would have implicated the plain view doctrine. Id. at 542, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 151. See supra
note 111 (explanation of plain view doctrine).
142. See cases cited infra note 147 (cases following a more modern approach).
143. 32 Cal. App. 3d 112, 110 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1973).
144. Id. at 114, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 587.
145. Id. at 116, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 588-89.
146. Id. at 118, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 590.
147. Id. at 118-19, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 589-90. Several other courts have followed the
"common habits" approach. See, e.g., People v. St. Amour, 104 Cal. App. 3d 886, 891, 163
Cal. Rptr. 187, 190 (1980) (reasonable expectation of privacy in airspace depends on showing
that land is used according to the common habits of those engaged in cultivation of agricultural
land); Burkholder v. Superior Court, 96 Cal. App. 3d 421, 425, 158 Cal. Rptr. 86, 88 (1979)(although reasonable expectation of privacy may extend into airspace, no reasonable expectation
of privacy exists for defendant with marijuana crop consistent with the common habits of
persons engaged in agriculture).
148. Dean, 32 Cal. App. 3d at 118-19, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 589-90.
149. Id.
1018
1987 / California v. Ciraolo
Joubert150 In this case, the court held that an individual has no right
to privacy from aerial examination conducted at a lawful altitude.
151
Thus, anyone who grows marijuana outdoors does so at the risk of
being seen by police officers in aircraft. 152 The Joubert court stated
that the only way to demonstrate a reasonable expectation of privacy
would be to shield the plants completely.1
3
These aerial search decisions demonstrate the prevailing position
taken by the California appellate courts. First, although the possibility
of a reasonable expectation of privacy within airspace was acknowl-
edged, that privacy right for all practical purposes was nonexistent.
54
Second, the California courts failed to incorporate the Katz principles
into analysis of aerial surveillance. 5 According to the decisions, the
fourth amendment was not violated by aerial observation that did
not involve any physical intrusion.- 6 The courts failed to consider
the policy expressed in Katz that reasonable privacy expectations
should not change simply because advancements are made in tech-
nology. 157
The first aerial search case decided by the California Supreme
Court, People v. Cook,5 ' involved facts remarkably similar to those
in California v. Ciraolo.59 In Cook, an informant reported to the
police that marijuana was being cultivated in the defendant's back-
yard. 16 Police attempted a ground search, but were unsuccessful,
because the yard was surrounded by a high fence.' 6' The police later
flew over the property and observed and photographed marijuana
150. 118 Cal. App. 3d 637, 173 Cal. Rptr. 428 (1981).
151. Id. at 647, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 434.
152. Id. at 646, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 434.
153. Id. The court suggested that only by growing the marijuana in a hothouse or by
otherwise shielding the plants completely from aerial surveillance would they be protected. See
also People v. St. Amour, 104 Cal. App. 3d 866, 892, 163 Cal. Rptr. 187, 190-91 (1980). The
court in St. Amour expanded this idea, stating that physical manifestations of privacy, such
as fences and signs, protected property from "earthly encroachments" only. Id.
154. See People v. Joubert, 118 Cal. App. 3d 637, 173 Cal. Rptr. 428 (1981); Burkholder
v. Superior Court, 96 Cal. App. 3d 421, 158 Cal. Rptr. 86 (1979); Dean, 32 Cal. App. 3d
112, 110 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1973).
155. See supra text accompanying notes 135-41 (discussion of appellate level aerial search
cases).
156. See supra text accompanying notes 138-53 (discussion of appellate level aerial search
cases).
157. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 352-53. See also Comment, supra note 131, at 794.
158. 41 Cal. 3d 373, 710 P.2d 299, 221 Cal. Rptr. 499 (1985).
159. 106 S. Ct. 1809. See supra notes 19-25 and accompanying text (discussion of Ciraolo
facts).
160. Cook, 41 Cal. 3d at 377, 710 P.2d at 302, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 501-02.
161. Id.
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plants growing in the yard. 62 Based on this evidence, a search warrant
was issued. 63 In reference to aerial surveillance, the California Su-
preme Court held that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy
in an enclosed backyard.' 64 Because private life within the home can
be expected to extend to outdoor areas, a high privacy interest must
exist in the curtilage. 65
The court strongly asserted that no state interest can justify "un-
fettered intrusions on the sanctity of private residences" that occur
through purposeful aerial surveillance. 66 The court differentiated
between occasional, inadvertant observation, as that which might
occur when a private or commercial airplane flies over a home, and
the intensive government spying that occurred in this instance. 167
According to the California Supreme Court, the airlanes are not
public highways, and routine aerial surveillance is not analogous to
a routine street patrol. 68 The California Supreme Court disapproved
of earlier appellate court opinions, 169 and stated that measures such
as covering a backyard are not necessary to ensure privacy. 170
Two important aspects of Cook should be noted. First, the case
was decided under the California Constitution, rather than on fourth
amendment grounds. 71 Second, although Cook was decided after
Proposition Eight was enacted, the facts occurred before the new
law went into effect. 72 Thus, Proposition Eight did not affect the
holding of Cook.
Proposition Eight, also known as the Victim's Bill of Rights, was
voted into law on June 8, 1982 and became part of the California
Constitution. 173 The provision known as the Right to Truth in Evi-
162. Id. at 377-78, 710 P.2d at 302, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 502.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 375-77, 710 P.2d at 300-02, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 500-01.
165. Id. at 379, 710 P.2d at 303, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 503.
166. Id. at 382, 710 P.2d at 305, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 505.
167. Id. at 380-81, 710 P.2d at 304, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 504.
168. Id. at 381-82, 710 P.2d at 304-05, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 504-05.
169. Id. at 385, 710 P.2d at 307-08, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 507. The court specifically disapproved
People v. Sneed, 32 Cal. App. 3d 535, 108 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1973) and People v. Superior
Court (Stroud), 37 Cal. App. 3d 836, 112 Cal. Rptr. 764 (1974).
170. Cook, 41 Cal. 3d at 377, 710 P.2d at 301, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 501.
171. Id. at 376, 710 P.2d at 300, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 500. The pertinent section of the
California Constitution is article XIII, § 1, which states: "The right of the people to be securein their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable seizures and searches may
not be violated. . . ." CAL. CONsT. art. XIII, § 1.
172. The facts of Cook which gave rise to the decision occurred on September 2, 1981.
Proposition Eight became effective on June 8, 1982. Cook, 41 Cal. 3d at 386 n.1, 710 P.2d
at 308 n.1, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 508 n.1 (Lucas, J., dissenting).
173. Section three of the Proposition Eight initiative became article I § 28 of the California
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dence states that relevant evidence may not be excluded in any
criminal proceeding.1 74 The effect of this provision is that all evidence
admissible under federal constitutional law will be admissible in the
California courts.175 The use of California's exclusionary rule is
therefore precluded whenever that rule entitles a suspect to have
greater rights than federal law would allow. 76
The California exclusionary rule is codified in Penal Code section
1538.5(d), which states that evidence may be suppressed on the
motion of the defendant if (1) the search or seizure was without a
warrant and was unreasonable, or (2) the search and seizure was
with a warrant, but was unreasonable. 77 The rule has not been
repealed. 7 1 Instead, the California Supreme Court must now interpret
search and seizure cases consistently with United States Supreme
Court interpretations. 79 Cases such as Cook, which are decided under
the California Constitution, as well as cases decided on fourth
amendment grounds are affected by Proposition Eight.8 0
The impact of Proposition Eight was recently illustrated in In re
Lance W. 11 In this case, the California Supreme Court held that
Proposition Eight precludes the use of article 1, section 13 of the
California Constitution. 8 2 This section essentially is California's par-
allel to the fourth amendment. 8 3 The court in Lance W. held that
Proposition Eight eliminated California's exclusionary rule as a ju-
Constitution. See Comment, Proposition 8: California Law after In Re Lance W. and People
v. Castro, 12 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 1059, 1063 (1985); CHRIsTrINsaN, PROPOSITION EIGHT: A
THREE YEAR RETRosPEcTrvE, at 12 (California Continuing Education of the Bar, 31st Annual
Summer Program August 1985).
174. The California Constitution article I, § 28(d) provides: "(d) Right to Truth in
Evidence... relevant evidence shall not be excluded in any criminal proceeding, including
pretrial and post conviction motions and hearings or in any trial or hearing of a juvenile for
a criminal offense.. . ." CAL CONST. art. I, § 28.
175. See In re Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d 873, 879, 649 P.2d 744, 750, 210 Cal. Rptr. 631, 634
(1985); Comment, supra note 173, at 1064; CRI sTIAsEN, supra note 173, at 13.
176. Id.
177. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1538.5 (West 1982).
178. See Comment, supra note 173, at 1064 n.26.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 1065. The effect of Proposition Eight on Cook was demonstrated by People v.
Smith, 180 Cal. App. 3d 72, 85, 225 Cal. Rptr. 348, 355 (1986). The court in Smith stated
that Cook could not be relied upon as precedent in an aerial search case if the facts giving
rise to the action occurred after Proposition Eight became effective. The court cited In re
Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d 873, 649 P-2d 744, 210 Cal. Rptr. 631 (1985), as authority for the
abolition of independent state grounds for the exclusion of evidence. Smith, 180 Cal. App. at
85, 225 Cal Rptr. at 355.
181. 37 Cal. 3d 873, 694 P.2d 744, 21 Cal. Rptr. 631 (1985).
182. Id. at 879, 694 P.2d at 747, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 634.
183. Compare U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV with CAL. CONST. art. I, § 13. See supra note 1
(text of U.S. CONST. amend. IV); supra note 171 (text of CAr. CONST. art. I, § 13).
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dicially created remedy for unlawful searches and seizures. 84 The
result is that although a search violating the California Constitution
would remain unlawful, the remedy for the violation no longer exists
in the form of excluding evidence. 8- In effect, Lance W. abolishes
California state law as grounds for the exclusion of evidence in the
area of search and seizure law. 1 6 In aerial surveillance cases, there-
fore, Ciraolo is now the controlling precedent.
III. RAMIFICATIONS
California v. Ciraolo marks an important change in the United
States Supreme Court's analysis of fourth amendment search and
seizure cases. In both Dow and Ciraolo, the Supreme Court claimed
to reaffirm the curtilage doctrine. 1 7 Nevertheless, the status of the
doctrine remains uncertain. In Dow, the Court specifically stated that
society does accept as reasonable an expectation of privacy in the
curtilage. 188 In Ciraolo, however, although the property searched was
considered curtilage, this protection was denied the defendant. 1 9
Both Ciraolo and Dow indicate that the Supreme Court will treat
precautions directed towards aerial surveillance quite differently from
those directed towards ground surveillance.190 Apparently, manifes-
tation of an expectation of privacy from ground surveillance will not
be sufficient to satisfy the first prong of the Katz test and therefore
protect against aerial surveillance.' 9' Precautions against both types
of surveillance would appear to be necessary to avoid the result
reached in Ciraolo.92 Presumably this new rule applies to both open
fields and curtilage.
184. Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d at 886-87, 694 P.2d at 752, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 639.
185. Id.
186. See Comment, supra note 173 at 1100; CMUSTIANSEN, supra note 173, at 13.
187. California v. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. 1809, 1812 (1986); Dow Chem. Co. v. United States,
106 S. Ct. 1819, 1825 (1986).
188. Id.
189. See Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. 1809, 1813.
190. See supra text accompanying notes 29-41 and 71-72.
191. See supra text accompanying notes 29-41 & 72.
192. At first glance, requiring precautions against both aerial and ground surveillance seems
reasonable. The Court failed to consider, however, the economic feasibility of imposing such
a requirement. The chances that homeowners who desire privacy are financially capable of
covering their backyards seems quite unlikely. The Court was not concerned with this economic
aspect in Dow. The record shows that the cost of enclosing one of the sections of the Dow
Chemical plant would have been approximately $15,000,000 in 1978, plus increased maintenance
costs. The Court apparently would still require the installation of a roof to protect against
aerial surveillance, even though this cost would probably render such roofing impossible. Dow,
106 S. Ct. at 1828 n.1 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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As the dissent points out, the Ciraolo analysis departs from the
principles expressed in Katz. 93 The majority in Ciraolo did not
consider the concerns of individual privacy as seriously as the Court
in Katz.194 Instead, the Court focused on the manner of surveillance. 195
Under the Court's reasoning, since the intrusion was not physical,
and since no one entered the curtilage, the defendant's rights of
privacy were not constitutionally protected. 96 An unfortunate result
of this new requirement, especially if extended by future cases, may
be a chilling effect on outdoor activity whether legal or illegal.197 As
the dissent warns, Ciraolo creates a probability that individuals do
not have an expectation of privacy unless they withdraw behind the
walls of their homes. 98 A roof would be required to protect outdoor
space. 199
Though the individual's privacy in and around the home tradition-
ally has been given much fourth amendment protection, 2°° the decision
in Ciraolo may open the door to a restriction of these protections.
With the growing use of high-tech law enforcement practices such as
aerial surveillance, privacy may well diminish even further. Although
society may benefit by a diminished crime rate with this increase in
allowable surveillance techniques, the loss of security "damages the
fabric of a free society and weakens its democratic institutions. 2 '1
Although Ciraolo may not appear to sanction the strongest, most
offensive kind of search, the decision may be a significant indication
of the possibility of future expansions in surveillance techniques. 20 2
Following the Ciraolo decision, warrantless aerial surveillance may
become an accepted police practice in the United States. Allowing
aerial surveillance of the curtilage without a warrant, however, ef-
193. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1814 (Powell, J., dissenting).
194. Id. at 1814-16 (Powell, J., dissenting).
195. Id. at 1817 (Powell, J., dissenting).
196. Id. at 1813.
197. People v. Cook, 41 Cal. 3d 373, 377, 710 P.2d 299, 301, 221 Cal. Rptr. 499, 502
(1985). The chilling effect would cause individuals to refrain not only from illegal activities
such as growing marijuana, but also private legal activities associated with the outdoors, such
as nude sunbathing, family activities, and the like. Id. at 382, 710 P.2d at 305, 221 Cal Rptr.
at 505.
198. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1819 n.10 (Powell, J., dissenting).
199. Cook, 41 Cal. 3d at 382, 710 P.2d at 305, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 505.
200. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1816 (Powell, J., dissenting). See supra text accompanying
notes 83-91.
201. See Comment, supra note 79 at 491.
202. "[B]ut illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing in that way,
namely, by silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure." Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1885).
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fectively permits technology to outmaneuver the fourth amendment.0 3
As the majority in Ciraolo reasoned, since the use of airways is
common,204 the public cannot reasonably expect privacy outdoors. 205
By consistently using technological aids for surveillance, therefore,
the government can dictate whether an expectation of privacy is
reasonable. The government's ability to use any means of technology
available, as long as within common knowledge, will make it increas-
ingly difficult for anyone to maintain complete privacy.20 By allowing
this result, curtilage has lost valued protections. 20 7 The routine use
of technological advances has provided the government with the
ability to do'exactly what the fourth amendment was designed to
prevent.208
Ciraolo will not only cause changes in federal interpretation of
fourth amendment search and seizure provisions, but will also have
considerable effect on California law. Proposition Eight and the
holding of In re Lance W. cause the federal standard to be the
governing standard for the exclusion of evidence in California, despite
the provisions of the California Constitution and the state's penal
code. Any decision of the United States Supreme Court is thus
rendered the effective law in California. Ciraolo therefore changes
the interpretation of the California Constitution regarding searches
and seizures. 209 Barring other grounds of exclusion, evidence discov-
ered through aerial surveillance conducted under circumstances sim-
ilar to those in Ciraolo and Cook will be admissible. Thus, although
People v. Cook was not directly overruled by the Ciraolo decision,
the holdings of Cook will no longer be controlling.210 The California
203. See Comment, supra note 79, at 479.
204. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1813.
205. Id. The majority stated that simply because an individual has succeeded in restricting
some views of activities, all views are not precluded from official observation. Id. at 1812.
Because the airways are routinely used, activities exposed to aerial surveillance are knowingly
exposed. Any activities observed are therefore not protected. Id.
206. See Amsterdam, supra note 108, at 384-85. "Big Brother is watching you .... In
the far distance a helicopter skimmed down between the roofs, hovered for an instant like a
blue-bottle, and darted away again with a curving flight. It was the Police Patrol, snooping
into people's windows." G. ORw-ru, 1984, at 6 (1949).
207. See supra notes 83-91.
208. See Amsterdam, supra note 108, at 384-85.
209. See supra text accompanying notes 173-86.
210. People v. Mayoff, 42 Cal. 3d 1302, 1321, 729 P.2d 166, 178, 233 Cal. Rptr. 2, 14
(1986) (Lucas, J., concurring) (in cases governed by Proposition Eight, the courts are compelled
to use federal law when application of the state exclusionary rule is concerned). Cook was
relied on, however, in one recent case. As with Cook, the facts in Mayoff occurred before
the enactment of Proposition Eight. Therefore, California's exclusionary rule did apply. In
Mayoff, a random aerial search of the defendant's property was conducted by local and federal
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appellate courts that have been analyzing aerial surveillance cases in
much the same manner as Ciraolo since 1973,211 now have the stamp
of approval from the United States Supreme Court.
At this time, two aerial search cases have been decided at the
appellate level in California since Ciraolo. Although both cases relied
on Ciraolo, the two courts came to opposing conclusions. In People
v. Venghiattis,2 2 members of the Marin County Sheriffs department
observed marijuana growing in a garden on the defendant's prop-
erty.213 Evidence based on this observation was held to be admissi-
ble.214 Relying on Ciraolo, the court stated first that the garden was
not within the curtilage of the defendant's home, and second, that
the defendant had not established a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy.215 Even though the garden was fenced and surrounded by six
officers. The search was part of a program conducted in several Northern California counties
where commercial marijuana farming is prevalant. As part of the program, there is a random
pattern of warrantless flights over Humbolt county, where the defendant, Mayoff, lived. The
operation is run jointly by local, state, and federal law enforcement authorities. Id. at 1308-09,
729 P.2d at 169, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 4-5. Based on the aerial surveillance a warrant for a
ground level search was obtained. Marijuana was found, and the defendant was arrested and
charged with the cultivation of marijuana under Health and Safety Code § 11358. Mayoff
pleaded guilty, and later appealed, claiming that the aerial surveillance violated his constitutional
rights under both the Federal and California Constitutions. The California Supreme Court
concluded that because the area searched was an open field, and not curtilage, the search did
not violate the fourth amendment or the California Constitution. The court, however, strongly
reasserted the holdings in Cook regarding aerial searches of curtilage, and disapproved of the
United States Supreme Court holdings in both Ciraolo and Dow. "Having carefully examined
the majority decisions in Ciraolo and Dow Chemical, .. . we find ourselves unconvinced by
their reasoning. We adhere to our holding in Cook." Id. at 1308, 1312-15, 729 P.2d at 168,
171-73, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 4, 7-9. The court recognized the dangers of aerial surveillance due
to the impossibility of protecting oneself from this type of observation, and stated that "precious
constitutional rights would mean nothing if the government could defeat them so easily [through
the use of aerial surveillance]." Id. at 1311, 729 P.2d. at 171, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 6-7. The
majority also stated that they realized that random aerial surveillance programs create difficult
constitutional and regulatory problems. The court suggested that the State Legislature should
participate in establishing standards to balance the needs of the legitimate privacy expectations
of citizens against the needs of law enforcement. Id. at 1319, 729 P.2d at 176, 233 Cal. Rptr.
at 12. In her dissent, Chief Justice Bird pointed out that while those conducting random aerial
surveillance may attempt to focus on open fields, avoiding views of private homes and the
surrounding curtilage would be impossible. Id. at 1323-24, 729 P.2d at 179-80, 233 Cal. Rptr.
at 15, (Bird, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Bird noted that there was not a dispute that the
defendant's home was also examined, as it was in the sight of the officers surveying the land.
According to Chief Justice Bird, "[tihe majority's conclusion presumes (1) that the officers
only inadvertently or incidentally looked into a curtilage and (2) that no warrant is required
if scrutiny of the curtilage occurs in the course of surveillance which is 'focused' on discover-
ing marijuana being cultivated beyond the curtilage." Id. at 1323-24, 729 P.2d at 179, 233 Cal.
Rptr. at 15.
212. 185 Cal. App. 3d 326, 229 Cal. Rptr. 636 (1986).
213. Id. at 329, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 637.
214. Id. at 332, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 639.
215. Id. at 331-32, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 639.
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foot high brush, the court stated that the defendant's efforts to hide
the garden from passers-by did not afford protection from aerial
observation. 2 6 The court stated that the decision was not controlled
by the holdings in Cook, since Proposition Eight and In re Lance
W. abrogated independent state grounds for the exclusion of evi-
dence. 217
Unlike Venghiattis, the court in People v. Sabo211 held that the
defendant in that case did have a reasonable expectation of privacy
which was violated by aerial surveillance.2 1 9 The Sabo court distin-
guished the case factually from Ciraolo, and therefore did not apply
Ciraolo's holdings.220 In Sabo, the observation of the defendants'
property and their marijuana plants were made by police officers in
a helicopter, from an altitude of 400 feet. 221 The court held that the
defendants' had manifested a reasonable expectation of privacy, as
the plants were enclosed within a greenhouse in the backyard. 222 The
defendants' right to privacy was violated because the helicopter flew
over the property at an altitude that was below navigable airspace. 23
According to the Sabo court, the holdings of Ciraolo and Dow are
limited to situations in which the observation occurs within navigable
airspace. 4 The court also made a point of distinguishing between
the use of helicopters and airplanes, stating that helicopters permit
a much more intrusive form of surveillance, due to their capabilities
to "gambol in the sky-turning, curtsying, tipping, hummingbird-
like suspended in space. ",225
. Ciraolo has thus begun to affect decisions of the California courts.
At least one California court, however, has attempted to limit Ciraolo
to the specific factual circumstances of the case. Although how much
Ciraolo will change law enforcement and aerial surveillance in Cali-
fornia remains to be seen, that changes will occur is inevitible.
216. Id. at 331, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 638-39.
217. Id. at 332, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 639.
218. 185 Cal. App. 3d 845, 230 Cal. Rptr. 170 (1986).
219. Id. at 849, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 172-73.
220. Id. at 850-53, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 172-75.
221. Id. at 850, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 172.
222. Id. at 849, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 172. The plants were viewed through gaps in the roof
of the greenhouse. According to the court, observation through the gaps would not have been
possible had the officers been in a plane, as they would not have been able to circle the area
as did the helicopter. Id. at 850, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 172.
223. Id. at 852-53, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 174-75.
224. Id. at 853-54, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 174-75.
225. Id. at 853, 230 Cal. Rptr. 6t 175.
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CONCLUSION
Deciding whether a particular law enforcement practice is appro-
priate requires a balancing of competing social interests. 226 In a fourth
amendment case, the individual's interest in security, must be bal-
anced against the government's interest in effective law enforce-
ment.227 The Constitution does not provide that individuals are
vulnerable to any means of government inspection they have failed
to prevent.2 28 On the other hand, nothing in the fourth amendment
prohibits police from increasing human capabilities through the use
of technology. 229 Efficient police practices do not necessarily equal
unconstitutional police practices. 20
In California v. Ciraolo, the Supreme Court seems to be continuing
its trend of withdrawal23' from the first prong of the Katz test. An
individual's subjective expectation of privacy no longer warrants the
same consideration as in the past. The type of location searched,
although always considered, has once again become a prevalent factor
in deciding whether a search is constitutional. In California, where
aerial searches are common, citizens must seek new ways of protecting
their property from observation by airborne policemen.
Carol Elizabeth Kelley
226. People v. Cook, 41 Cal. 3d 373, 376, 710 P.2d 299, 301, 221 Cal. Rptr. 499, 501
(1985); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-55 (1978).
227. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 654.
228. Cook, 41 Cal. 3d at 382, 710 P.2d at 305, 221 Cal. App. at 505.
229. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282 (1982).
230. Id. at 284.
231. See supra text accompanying notes 112-21 (discussion of Supreme Court's retreat from
Katz as indicated in Oliver), & 193-96 (discussion of Supreme Court's retreat from Katz as
indicated by Ciraolo).
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